Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Anthropology Faculty Publications

Anthropology

8-2021

Litigating for Legality: Nature Conservation, Commercial Fisheries
and Disputed Territoriality in Ukraine’s Danube Delta
Tanya Richardson
Wilfrid Laurier University, trichardson@wlu.ca

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/anth_faculty
Part of the Anthropology Commons

Recommended Citation
Richardson, T. 2021. Litigating for Legality: Nature Conservation, Commercial Fisheries and Disputed
Territoriality in Ukraine’s Danube Delta. Journal of Agrarian Change. https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12444

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Anthropology at Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholars
Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Richardson, T. 2021. Litigating for Legality: Nature Conservation, Commercial Fisheries and
Disputed Territoriality in Ukraine’s Danube Delta. Journal of Agrarian Change.
https://doi.org/10.1111/joac.12444
Accepted version. For published version please contact author.
TANYA RICHARDSON
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR
DEPARTMENT OF GLOBAL STUDIES
WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY
Email: trichardson@wlu.ca
LITIGATING FOR LEGALITY: NATURE CONSERVATION, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES, AND
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Abstract
Between 2014 and 2016 Ukraine’s Danube Biosphere Reserve (DBR) administrators devoted
extensive time to lawsuits in which they defended the legality of commercial fisheries in reserve
territory. Two cases are discussed in order to examine what impact litigation had and why
administrators pursued litigation when dominant accounts of law in Ukraine suggest that
avoiding the courts might be a more likely response. It analyzes court documents and
interviews gathered during anthropological research about nature conservation in the Danube
Delta by combining insights from political ecology, agrarian studies, and socio-legal scholarship
on Ukraine. Even though administrators lost their cases and had to rezone the reserve,
engaging in litigation helped them defend fishing commons against further enclosure by
environmentalists, state officials, and business people, and to minimize predatory behavior that
could exclude delta residents. This demonstrates litigation’s important but often overlooked
role in challenging the outcomes of natural resource-related internal state territorialization.
Keywords: litigation, territoriality, access, exclusion, fisheries, conservation, Danube, Ukraine
Oleksandr Voloshkevych and Vasyl Fedorenko, the Director and Deputy Director of
Ukraine’s Danube Biosphere Reserve, have been to court dozens of times since they started
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working together in 1994. “Do you want to go to court with us?” was practically the first
question the director asked me during our initial meeting in the Reserve’s office in the Danube
Delta town of Vylkove on June 6, 2008. Since then, ministry officials, ecological inspectors, and
environmentalists have emphasized to me that DBR administrators stand out among their
Ukrainian colleagues not only for the number of times they have been to court as plaintiff and
defendant, but also for their disputes’ topical range and the variety of legal jurisdictions –
including Ukraine’s Higher Administrative Court – in which their cases have been heard.
Between 2014 and 2016 – a period straddling Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution, Russia’s
annexation of Crimea, and the Donbas War – the DBR was involved with two cases related to
commercial fishing in its territory. In both instances, parties alleged that the conduct of fishing
in the Reserve violated Ukraine’s 1992 Protected Areas Law. In the first case, DBR
administrators went to the Odesa Circuit Administrative Court to dispute a report written by a
sub-unit of Ukraine’s State Ecological Inspection (SEI) during an annual inspection conducted in
March 2014 against the backdrop of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Administrators were
accused of allowing fisheries to operate on DBR territory without a Total Allowable Catch (TAC)
approved by the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources (MENR). In the second case, the
DBR was involved as a “third party” in a lawsuit in the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court initiated
by two NGOs in May 2014. The NGOs claimed that MENR had violated the Protected Areas Law
by approving the DBR’s foundational document (polozhennia) which permitted commercial
fishing in the core zone (Figure 1). In these cases the livelihoods of hundreds of rural
households were at stake.
The passage of an amendment to the Protected Areas Law – Article 9.1 – in January
2010 provides the backdrop for these lawsuits. MENR initiated this amendment, and it passed
just prior to Viktor Yanukovych’s election as Ukraine’s president. With Article 9.1 MENR sought
to enhance its authority to issue harvest limits (including TACs) and permits – the documents
required to use natural resources in the protected area system. While Article 9.1 did not name
specific resources, it was interpreted to include fisheries’ TACs which had previously been
managed by the State Fisheries Committee of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy (MAP). Article 9.1
created so much disarray in 2011, its first year in operation, that fishermen were stuck on the
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Figure 1 The zones of the Danube Biosphere Reserve between 2004 and 2017. Map by Iryna Iakovlieva. Used with
permission.
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Danube’s banks for the first two weeks of March, the most important period in the year for
earning an income from the herring run.
Litigation’s prominence in the life of the DBR and administrators’ goals in engaging in it
are puzzling for three key literatures that might help explain this situation: the political ecology
of protected areas, agrarian studies of territoriality, access and exclusion, and socio-legal
scholarship about post-Soviet countries. With the exception of Derick Fay’s (2013) South African
research, litigation is practically absent in the political ecology of protected areas in spite of the
increasing juridification of environmental conflicts (Merlinsky and Latta, 2012) and conflict
more generally (Eckert et al., 2012). DBR administrators’ actions also contradict many political
ecology analyses in which parks and reserves operate as forms of enclosure that dispossess
residents even when inclusionary measures are adopted (Neumann, 2002; Holmes, 2014), and
administrators appear indifferent to residents’ problems or complicit in their dispossession
(Dorondel and Mitroi, 2019). While law is central to agrarian studies of territoriality, access and
exclusion (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995), litigation rarely makes an appearance. Finally, DBR
administrators’ actions complicate a prominent story in English-language socio-legal scholarship
about law-in-practice in Ukraine, Russia, and other postsocialist countries. These scholars
emphasize citizens’ preferences for resolving conflicts through informal politics and economic
transactions rather than directly engaging the legal system (Ledeneva, 2006; Polese, 2013;
Oltramonti and Tănăsescu, 2019).1
This article thus provides an answer to two questions. What impact did litigation have
on the conduct of fisheries in DBR territory? Why did DBR administrators take part in litigation
via Ukraine’s administrative justice system in order to defend the legality of fisheries in the
Reserve’s core zone, and the lawfulness of their conduct? Drawing on anthropological research
conducted between 2008 and 2016 about nature conservation and natural resource use in
Ukraine’s Danube Delta, I make two key arguments. First, I argue that although DBR
1

I transliterate legal terms and personal and place names from Ukrainian except when a person is an
ethnic Russian. Interviews were conducted in Russian, the language my interlocutors used in everyday
life. I transliterate from Russian when quoting direct speech. There are two words for law in Russian and
Ukrainian: pravo (law) and zakon (the law, legislative act) (Burlyuk, 2015, 10). Readers familiar with the
Ukrainian context can assume that when the terms legality, legal, and illegal are used in reference to
these cases the respective Ukrainian terms are zakonnist’, zakonnyi, and nezakonnyi.
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administrators lost their cases and had to rezone the Reserve, engaging in litigation helped
defend local fishing commons against further enclosure by environmentalists, state officials and
outside business people, and to limit officials’ predatory behavior. Second, I argue that DBR
administrators’ engagement in litigation stems from a) a pragmatic assessment of their tense,
interdependent relationship with fishermen many of whom feel “if there were no reserve, we
wouldn’t have any problems”; b) ethical commitments to a vision of nature conservation in
which rural residents can maintain their livelihoods; and c) the DBR’s institutional location in
the Academy of Sciences which gives them the autonomy and connections needed to enact
their principles. This account shows the often-overlooked significance of litigation in challenging
and negotiating norms of natural resource governance, including associated territorial
classifications. It also demonstrates how ethnographic accounts focused on protected area
administrators can enhance our understand conservation outcomes, something we know little
about (Kiik, 2019).
The litigation described unfolded amidst the events of the Maidan Revolution and the
Donbas War, events that provoked profound political, legal, cultural and socioeconomic
upheaval (Yurchenko, 2017). In spring 2014, when the Donbas insurgency and Russian
intervention began, Odesa Oblast2 was thought to be vulnerable because so many people had
opposed the Maidan protests, having voted for Yanukovych and his Party of Regions deputies
(Richardson, 2019). While some people I consulted for this article supported the Maidan
protests, others vehemently opposed them, and some hoped to join Russia. These differences
existed among DBR employees, fishing firm directors, and officials. Despite this, many of them
cooperated to ensure 650 fishermen were on the water fishing in March 2014, instead of
joining a rebel movement, which some might have been persuaded to do, particularly if
deprived of their livelihood. Thus, analyzing how and why DBR administrators turned to courts
to defend their claims illuminates an idiosyncratic yet positive case of the use of domestic law
and global conservation norms to balance nature conservation and residents’ fishing livelihoods
in a chronically underfunded state-run biosphere reserve during a politically volatile period.

2

‘Oblast’ is the name of regional administrative units in Ukraine’s unitary state.
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Litigating for Legality, Disputing Territoriality: Between political ecology, agrarian studies, and
socio-legal studies of Ukraine
If political ecology can be defined concisely as a framework that integrates “the
concerns of ecology and… political economy” (Blaikie and Brookfield in Bridge et al., 2015, 7) in
order to study “power relations and political conflict over ecological distribution and social
struggles for the appropriation of nature” (Leff, 2015, 33), political ecology of protected areas
examines conflicts that arise among local residents, administrators, scientists, state officials,
and corporate actors over policies to limit human access to particular territories for the benefit
of their ecologies (Walley, 2004; West et al., 2006). Focused until recently on the Global South,
these studies have analyzed conflicts arising from broader processes such as internal state
territorialization (Roth, 2008; Corson, 2011; Holmes, 2014), and neoliberal policies, practices,
and governance (Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Empirically rich political ecology analyses in
former socialist-now-EU-member states show how protected areas work similarly to those in
the Global South, for example in disenfranchising fishermen in Romania’s Danube Delta (Van
Assche et al., 2011; Teampău, 2020). They also show differences, such as foresters’
collaboration with local people to resist environmentalists’ efforts to expand a national park
(Blavascunas 2014), and the alignment of agrarian and environmentalist understandings of
nature with discourses of national identity and Europeanization (Ibid.; Schwartz, 2006).
However, few such studies exist for non-EU post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine (but see
Metzo, 2009; Richardson, 2015). Finally, despite Thompson’s (1975) analysis of the complex
relationship between laws, agrarian change, and disputes over access to an 18th century English
forest, few scholars have dealt with litigation with the exception of Fay (2013, 2020).3
Like Fay I make the case for analyzing litigation because of what it reveals about wider
political economic transformations and their impact on access to natural resources. Fay argues
that groups involved in managing South Africa’s Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve turned to
litigation to pursue political goals largely because of conservation’s neoliberalization.4 I take a
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I thank a reviewer for the Thompson reference.
The state’s downsizing and the transformation of communities into property-holding legal subjects –
two key features of neoliberal, rights-based conservation – multiplied relationships formalized through
4
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different approach, however, because of three key differences between Fay’s case and mine.
First, the DBR cases center on contradictory laws, including uncertainty over who has the
authority to act in their name. They thus involve the sphere of administrative law in Ukraine’s
civil law system, which deals with challenges to the legality of officials’ actions and normative
acts (Solomon 2004, 553), rather than private contract law in a common law system. Second,
one of the DBR’s cases involved litigation against another state institution where some officials
used regulation to generate illicit revenue. Third, many of neoliberal conservation’s features are
absent in the DBR, most notably an ownership structure in which communities are legal
subjects and a reserve’s formal property owners. While Vylkovchany own plots in the DBR
(Vylkove is not part of it), the State Forestry Service and the Academy of Sciences-based DBR
are the largest title holders, and the latter holds the title to the areas this article discusses. In
contrast to the multiple public and private entities involved in running the Dwesa-Cwebe
Nature Reserve, the DBR administrators are public servants whose salaries are paid from state
funds. While neoliberalization is present in Ukraine, the a priori application of a neoliberal
conservation framework would obscure the post-Soviet dynamics that shape conservation
conflicts.
Because the Danube cases center on legal contradictions about what can be done in
particular areas, I adopt agrarian studies concepts of territoriality, access and exclusion.
Territoriality is the “attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people,
phenomena, and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area” (Sack
in Peluso and Vandergeest, 1995, 387-8) while “internal territorialization” is about “excluding or
including people within particular geographic boundaries and about controlling what people do
and their access to natural resources within those boundaries” (Peluso and Vandergeest, 1995,
388). The Thai case these authors analyze is instructive not only because of how successive laws
changed definitions of forests and the kinds of activity allowed in particular territories (e.g.
cultivation or clearing), but also because of how the Forestry Department and Interior Ministry
responded differently to them. My study adds to scholarship on territoriality by detailing the

legal instruments of contract and constitution. Consequently, when disagreements arose, community
actors turned to courts.
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role of litigation in challenging, upholding, and changing the way territory is classified, what
particular classifications mean, and who has the authority to regulate resource use in them.
While the DBR’s cases center on the application of law and regulation, the motivation to
litigate arises from disputes over whether people can fish in DBR territory, and, if they can, who
can fish there. The twin analytical frameworks of access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) and exclusion
(Hall et al., 2011) can help identify what is at stake, including why administrators pursued a
complicated, nerve-wracking rezoning process after losing one case. Access, defined as the
ability to benefit from things rather than just the right to benefit from them, draws attention to
a wider range of relationships than does the concept of property. Access is about “who does
(and who does not) get to use what, in what ways, and when” (Neale in Ribot and Peluso, 2003,
154). For Hall et al. exclusion is the flipside of access – “the ways in which people are prevented
from benefiting from things” (7). Four key powers – regulation, force, the market and
legitimation – interact to produce, for example, the exclusion of smallholders from parks and
indigenous people from land markets (4, 12). Exclusion is thus an ambivalent, double-edged
process that is “both a necessary element in the orderly and productive use of land, and a
threat to livelihoods” (12).
The biological, ecological, and geographical features of capture fisheries give the
dynamics of access, exclusion and territoriality distinct characteristics (McCay and Acheson,
1987). Fish are renewable but exhaustible (Campling et al., 2012). In contrast to people’s highly
personalized relations with cattle, they are “fungible and impersonal” and resist individuation
(Wheeler 2017, 204). Production is highly seasonal, and large gaps exist in understandings of
fish behavior and ecological relationships (Mansfield and St. Martin in Sneddon, 2007, 174).
While fish are mobile, aquatic species, there is a strong territorial aspect to fishing as fishing
rights are often attached to specific “grounds” (Palsson, 1982; Sneddon, 2007, 174).
Consequently, property relations in fisheries have distinct and highly variable forms (Campling
et al., 2012).
Fisheries scholars have long argued that preventing depletion means excluding some
people from fishing grounds by placing temporal and spatial limits on access, a task that is
complicated by fisheries’ aquatic character and the fugitive nature of fish-as-resource (McCay
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and Acheson, 1987). States now play a central role in arbitrating property rights and access in
most inland and capture fisheries; state officials may “use or (avoid using) regulatory and
enforcement capacity to generate outcomes that privilege particular players in fisheries
systems” (Campling et al. 2012, 195). However, the coastal and riparian environments’ physical
features may affect who extracts how much (Campling and Colas, 2018; Foley and Mather,
2019).
The imposition of territorial nature conservation’s abstract spatial form (Roth, 2008) on
the Danube’s anthropogenic, fluctuating, amphibious milieus has created obstacles and
openings for inspectors, DBR employees, residents, and environmentalists in struggles over
resource use (Richardson, 2018). The Kiliia Delta began forming 350 years ago when the
Danube’s Kiliia Arm broke through the Zhebrian Sand Ridge, around the time that Russian Old
Believer Nekrassov Cossacks and Ukrainian Zaporizhzhian Cossacks began settling in the region,
attracted to the abundant fish (Prigarin, 2015; Silantieva-Skorobogatova, 1996). Below Vylkove,
the river branches around a series of dish-shaped islands which are inundated for much of the
year, with the exception of their natural levees and human-made embankments. Small lakes –
located near the richest fishing grounds at the Danube’s mouths – formed as a result of the
discharge of muddy water, the movements of Black Sea currents, and residents’ efforts to clear
vegetation from the waterways that feed them. The layering of Soviet, Ukrainian, and global
legal norms pertaining to conservation and natural resources here thus generates competing
claims about whether key fishing grounds are a) pristine nature from which humans should be
excluded b) an ecology that can co-exist with fishing, or c) an area where commercial fisheries
should be prioritized.
The DBR cases are interesting not simply because of the legal indeterminacies arising
from the intersection of contradictory laws with a place whose ecological and
geomorphological specificities do not parse neatly into state territorial classifications
(Richardson, 2018). Administrators’ efforts to prevent fishermen’s exclusion from DBR territory,
to limit the pretext for inspection agencies’ payment demands, and their use of environmental,
historical and legal knowledge in doing so are also significant. When administrators rezoned the
Reserve after losing one case, they fought to retain a mechanism to control who (and how

9

many) could fish through preparing documents, mobilizing officials to provide appropriatelyworded letters, and issuing threats. Therefore, through litigation and rezoning administrators
defended a kind of “limited-access common pool resource” (Ostrom, 1990, 48) in which local
residents – rather than fishermen, businessmen or inspectors from elsewhere – were fisheries’
prime beneficiaries. Although DBR administrators do not use this term,5 it helps situate their
work in relation to other management systems that aim to prevent “tragedies of the
unmanaged commons” and open access systems (McCay and Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990;
McCay, 2012).
The key role of the politics of regulation, law, and justice in Ukraine’s post-Soviet
political economy can partially explain litigation’s prevalence in the DBR. Dense networks of
officials in different state branches (executive, presidential vertical, judiciary, law enforcement)
have been immensely consequential for entrepreneurial activity (Allina-Pisano, 2007; Bojcun,
2014, 2020; Yurchenko, 2017). Ukraine’s emergent oligarchic capitalism in the 1990s depended
on a large state apparatus and extensive regulation to facilitate accumulation (ibid). Oligarchic
“clans” whose political networks cross-cut executive, judicial and legislative branches of power
competed to “colonize the state apparatus and sections of the economy” and “exercise state
and regulatory capture” (Chebanenko et al. in Burlyuk, 2015, 7). While the juridification of
environmental conflict is sometimes depoliticizing, in post-Soviet contexts, legal action is often
an extension of highly antagonistic bureaucratic politics (Popova, 2012). Administrators’
engagement in litigation was part of post-Soviet bureaucratic politics and “lawfare” (Comaroff
and Comaroff, 2006) but they tried to pry apart legal, political, and economic domains, and to
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Eppinger (2018, 485) argues that the terms “community” (hromada) and territorial community
(teritorialna hromada) have come to have practical and legal force in Ukraine and that the term
“commons” (hromada) is now used more frequently in Ukraine. A related Ukrainian word for commons
is spilne, an adjective meaning “common,” “shared,” “together,” or “joint” as in Spilne/Commons, the
name of a journal of left critical commentary. However, neither hromada nor spilne are idioms in which
struggles to access fishing grounds have so far been waged. Rather, people refer to land, water, forests,
air or the resources they support such as fish (referred to as vodni bioresursy, literally “aquatic
bioresources” in fisheries management). This may stem from the history of Soviet property relations
(see Eppinger). It may also be because neither hromada nor spilne reference physical landscapes as
directly as “commons” does.
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establish a semblance of legal order (poriadok) in place of (or amidst) the disorder (bardak)
stemming from the proliferation of regulation (cf. Fournier, 2012, 25-27).
While socio-legal scholarship about post-Soviet citizens’ relationship to courts and
litigation can help understand fishing firms’, fishermen’s and DBR administrators’ legal
conundrums, it does not provide a clear-cut answer as to why litigation was pursued. In Ukraine
scholars have highlighted issues such as the “weak demand for the rule of law” (Burlyuk, 2015),
the politicization of justice (Popova, 2012), the impact of the state bureaucracy’s
(mal)functioning on lower civil courts (Kurkchiyan, 2013), bureaucratic corruption (Zaloznaya,
2017), and how private property’s introduction undermined democratic community formation
(Eppinger 2015). On the one hand, they note high levels of litigation among Ukrainian and
Russian citizens (Hendley, 2015; Popova, 2012). On the other, they underscore that Ukrainian
and Russian citizens tend to separate categories of law and justice and try to resolve issues
without resorting to courts, sometimes in circumvention of the law (Burlyuk, 2015; Ledeneva,
2006; Fournier, 2012; Polese, 2013). If there is “near universal cynicism about the law” in
Ukraine (Burlyuk 2015, 5) and if administrators in many sectors often avoid litigation by
participating in informal exchanges with law enforcement agencies, why do DBR administrators
litigate?
Answering this question requires an ethnographic approach attentive to institutional
histories, biographies, litigants’ social relationships, and the specificities of landscape.
Sociologists’ and political scientists’ socio-legal scholarship is premised on a supply/demand
binary (which treats all domains of society and human motivation as if they work according to
neoclassical economic principles) or a formal/informal binary (which obscures how the basis for
what counts as formal and informal is negotiated and challenged). Foregrounding litigation and
DBR administrators’ biographies and social relationships shifts the analysis to struggles over
where the boundary between formal and informal lies, a point we miss if it is posited in
advance. This also allows for writing portraits of conservationists as complicated “desiring,
relating, …contentious, affective… human subjects” (Boyer 2008 in Kiik, 2019, 2) rather than the
indifferent, rational, abstract subjects which figure in so many accounts (Ibid.).
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Research materials were collected during 10 months of ethnographic fieldwork in
Vylkove between 2008 and 2016 and through monthly telephone conversations between visits.
I talked with DBR administrators, scientists, and staff in their offices, joined them on trips to
DBR territories, read reports, and attended meetings. I also conducted semi-structured
interviews with people involved in fishing and nature protection including two former fishing
collective directors, four fishing firm directors, the Fishing Association head, 12 fishermen, two
ecological inspectors, and a MENR official. This article therefore not only contributes to the stillsmall literatures on post-Soviet fisheries and protected areas (e.g. Nakhshina, 2012; Wheeler,
2017; Richardson, 2015), but also demonstrates the importance of litigation as a site for
analyzing how the outcomes internal state territorialization may be disputed and renegotiated,
including, occasionally to the benefit of local resource users. Next, I provide additional
background on conservation-related territorialization and the political economy of fisheries
before turning to the cases.
Nature conservation and fisheries in Ukraine’s Danube Delta
Vylkove’s fishers have often had difficulty accessing fisheries over the past 200 years
when the international border shifted and laws changed (Ardeleanu, 2018; Prigarin, 2015).6
However, Vylkovchany’s encounter with nature conservation-related internal territorialization
began in 1967 after the Ukrainian SSR’s Council of Ministers passed a resolution that created a
small, one kilometre-wide ‘monument of nature’ along the coast. In 1973 more territories were
added when it became the Danube branch of the Academy of Sciences’ Black Sea Nature
Reserve (Kovalenko et al., 2010) and it was expanded again in 1981 to form the 14,851-hectare
Dunaiskii Plavni Nature Reserve (DPNR) (Ibid.). Like other Soviet reserves (zapovidnyky), the
DPNR was created for the purposes of scientific research in a top-down manner (Weiner, 1988).
Hunting, pasturing cattle, and the harvesting of water nuts, reeds and berries were prohibited.
Fishing should have been banned but an exception was made because of fisheries’ economic

6

Since 1944, the Danube’s Kiliia arm has served as the international boundary – first between the USSR
and socialist Romania, then between Ukraine and Romania, and since 2007 as the European Union’s
external border after Romania joined the EU.

12

significance and because the Lenin Fishing Collective – one of the largest in Soviet Ukraine –
wielded considerable clout. The continuation of fishing and the lack of enforcement due to
understaffing muted the Reserve’s impact on residents’ livelihoods (Richardson, 2018).
The DPNR’s transformation into the DBR (one of eight UNESCO-recognized Ukrainian
biosphere reserves) occurred after Romania’s delta was designated a UNESCO Natural World
Heritage Site in 1991 (Van Assche et al. 2011, 8). A World Bank project to build “institutional
capacity” in nature protection in the Romanian delta through creating a biosphere reserve was
expanded to include the Ukrainian delta. In addition to funding equipment, building
construction, and scientific research to assemble species inventories, the number of staff,
including wardens also increased. In 1995, the Kiliia Delta was designated a Wetland of
International Significance under the Ramsar Convention and in 1998 a presidential decree
formally established the DBR and expanded its territory threefold. The DBR became part of a
UNESCO Transboundary Biosphere Reserve together with Romania’s Danube Delta Biosphere
Reserve in 1999.
Biosphere reserves, UNESCO’s response to “fortress conservation’s” failure, use zones
to create a “buffer” around the most sensitive areas and to support local livelihoods. UNESCO
proposes three: a core zone with a strict protection regime; a buffer zone surrounding the core
zone where livelihood activities are permitted; and a transition zone (anthropogenic zone in
Ukrainian law) where agricultural and other economic activities may be permitted and where
co-management can occur. Ukrainian law also has a fourth zone, a regulated protection zone,
which lies between core and buffer zones in strictness. While the DPNR became the core zone,
additional areas were zoned to allow gardening, pasturing, reed harvesting, fishing and, until
2010, hunting. When Ukraine joined UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Program in 1997, it
acquired international obligations that include implementing UNESCO strategies to improve
biosphere reserves’ functioning. One – the Seville Strategy (1995) – emphasized collaboration
with residents to support livelihoods.
While DBR administrators were largely satisfied with Ukraine’s 1992 Protected Areas
Law until the introduction of Article 9.1, some scholars claim it falls short according to UNESCO
standards (e.g. Elbakidze et al., 2013, 161-162). In contrast to UNESCO which does not consider
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biosphere reserves protected areas, Ukraine’s law treats them as zapovidnyky, that is, as part of
its protected area system (zapovidnyi fond) instead of creating a special category of reservat,
the term Ukrainian specialists use for a what UNESCO means by “reserve.” Ukraine’s biosphere
reserves are therefore not fully differentiated from strict nature reserves which exclude most
human activity. Further, the law does not clearly establish the category of “traditional economic
activity” which UNESCO says biosphere reserves should support. Indeed, “traditional economic
activity” is not elaborated elsewhere in Ukrainian law either though it was incorporated into
the DBR’s foundational document (polozhennia) and territorial organization document – key
legal documents in the DBR’s functioning. While DBR administrators saw ways to improve the
law, read carefully, it was flexible enough to develop place-specific management strategies.
MENR is the main governing body for all protected areas in Ukraine. Although most
Ukrainian protected areas are MENR subsidiaries, the Academy of Sciences, the Agrarian
Academy of Sciences, and the Forestry Service also have protected areas and biosphere
reserves. The DBR is subordinated to the Academy of Science’s [henceforth Academy] General
Biology Department while the Marine Biology Institute in Odesa provides guidance on scientific
research. However, the DBR reports to MENR in addition to the Academy, and MENR approves
its polozhennia and territorial organization document (several hundred pages). While MENR
pays salaries and operating costs in its reserves, the DBR receives funds for salaries only from
the Academy’s budget; it earns money for its operating costs from service fees which it charges
to tourist, reed harvesting, and fishing firms.
The DBR’s institutional location in the Academy is important for understanding its
administrators’ approach. Founded in 1918, the Academy currently has nearly 30,000
employees working in 160 research institutes and other units, including the Marine Biology
Institute. The Academy (whose first president was Volodymyr Vernadsky, the biochemist who
elaborated the biosphere concept informing the UNESCO program) is one of Ukraine’s largest
property owners. Though under-funded and frequently criticized for its inertia, the Academy’s
ability to mobilize its intellectual resources, prestige, and political clout to defend its interests
has led to its designation as a “state within a state.” For example, the DBR became embroiled in
a number of lawsuits and its administrators subject to a criminal investigation just prior to the
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2004 Orange Revolution because they opposed the Transport Ministry’s decision to construct a
deep-channel shipping lane in the Bystre Arm then located in the Reserve’s core zone
(Fedorenko, 2006; Richardson, 2015). Although the shipping lane was built, with the support of
the Academy’s lawyers DBR administrators were able to win a case against the transport
company that claimed the Danube’s waterways did not belong to the Reserve. DBR
administrators’ involvement gave them intimate familiarity with militia, the security services,
prosecutors, courts of different jurisdictions, and the intricacies of interpreting laws and
documents from different periods.
As the DPNR became the DBR, profound changes to Danube and Black Sea fisheries’
ownership structure, management and regulation also intensified internal state
territorialization. Before 1991, a USSR-wide Fisheries Ministry managed all fisheries, and state
organizations were responsible for purchasing and distributing fish, building boats, supplying
credit, employing fishermen, and delivering welfare (Knudsen and Toje, 2008, 18). In the late
1980s, approximately 1600-1700 Vylkovchany worked for the Lenin Fishing Collective and the
State Fish Processing Plant (Bassov, 2008, 30-32). Like their counterparts elsewhere, after the
Soviet Union’s demise, Vylkove’s collective and processing plant struggled with the
disappearance of state support and the introduction of new property relations (Knudsen and
Toje, 2008; Wheeler, 2017). When the State Fisheries Committee was placed in Ukraine’s MAP,
fishing collectives became subject to the same policies as land-based agricultural ones.
Vylkove’s collective became a joint-stock holding company called the Vylkove fishing-agrarian
collective enterprise (Vylkove rybo-ahrarne kollektyvne pidpriemstvo or VRAKP). Enterprises’
property was divided into shares based on salary and length of employment which laid the
groundwork for the controversial, murky distribution of equipment, money, and land between
1997 and 2004 when VRAKP ceased to exist.7 All other state enterprises have since closed.

7

Deputy Mayor and former VRAKP Director, Ivan Soloviev, interview, October 14, 2009. The processing
plant had a different fate: a financial group from nearby Izmail bought it and allowed it to go bankrupt
to eliminate a competitor.
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In Vylkove, a town with an official population of 9260 in 2001, fishing firm ownership is
distributed among 11 small firms which formed before, during, and after the VRAKP unraveled.8
In the 1990s, individual private entrepreneurs called “sponsors” created an illegal alternative
purchasing and distribution system by offering fishermen higher prices for fish than VRAKP and
cutting deals with inspectors and the police.9 As the VRAKP went bankrupt these entrepreneurs
– some of whom were former collective employees – purchased buildings, equipment, and land
cheaply from share-holders thereby acquiring capital for their private firms.10 The first private
firms appeared in 1997; the number increased after VRAKP collapsed in 2004 (DPNR, 1998, 46;
DBR, 2005, 185). The Association of Fishing Firms which lobbies common interests, formed in
2003. Firms’ primary focus is the sale of fresh-caught fish, mainly within Ukraine, rather than
adding value through processing and preservation.
The reorganization of ownership made fishermen’s labor conditions much more
precarious. Fishermen became responsible for providing boats, equipment and fuel. Because
most are hired to fish herring (pontic shad) between March 1 and July 5, the firms’ pension
contributions are minimal and they offer no social assistance.11 Each firm hires 50-60 fishermen
for the herring run who work in crews of two in uncovered wooden boats and smaller numbers
at other times to catch Black Sea mullet or freshwater species such as carp, pike and catfish.
Firms obtain licenses, quotas and documents for fishermen and maintain infrastructure to store
and distribute fish. Fishermen are paid cash for 70% of their catch at a daily price the
association sets. Those with their own equipment can make a few thousand dollars in a good
year but this is reduced for those who must rent equipment or borrow money to buy it. No
association exists to advocate for fishermen.
Private firms navigated changes in state institutions, laws, and regulations, and in the
DBR’s management strategies. The State Fisheries Committee [subsequently the National
Fisheries Agency or NAF] works with ministry-affiliated scientific institutes to set the TAC for
8

The better off have a gross annual income of approximately $US 60-70,000 though this varies by firm
and by year. Vylkovchany own 10 firms while a businessman from the neighboring Tatarbunary District
owns the eleventh.
9
Fishing Association Head, Grigorii Goncharev, interview, November 10, 2009.
10
Ivan Soloviev, interview, November 4, 2009.
11
Fisherman Aleksander Shwets, interview, November 16, 2009.
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specific water bodies and specific commercial fisheries. These are divided up each season into
non-transferable quotas which are issued for particular water bodies and species according to
firms’ catch the previous year and their equipment capacity. Firms fish under different TACs,
including the Danube one, whose area extends from the Ukrainian-Moldovan border to the
Kiliia mouth. Prior to Article 9.1, firms followed the 2005 Instructions on Fisheries, a MAPissued order that referenced other laws. In addition to rules about TACs and quotas, the
Instructions identified fishing firms’ and fishers’ other required documents.
In 2002, the State Ecological Inspection (SEI) was created in order to enforce
environmental legislation and has been a key agent in territorial control, one subunit of which
the DBR disputed in court. Its jurisdiction partially overlaps with the Fisheries Inspection, a
State Fisheries Committee-run (later NAF-run) monitoring body. Both Inspections were
criticized for engaging in illegal activity such as catching fish during spawning periods, and using
impossible-to-follow rules to extract money and fish from fishermen and firm owners. Grigorii
Goncharev, the Fishing Association head and one of Vylkove’s first private firm owners,
described the challenges he faced:
In 2002 they began to control us strongly. The Fisheries Inspection gave us the
document to catch fish. Then the SEI came and told us that we couldn’t fish, and that
our document was not valid. I said, “Look, I have an official permit.” They said, “You
can’t fish with those nets.” I said, “Look I have a special card that says I can fish with
these nets.”… They had changed the format and banned the use of nets for mackerel in
the Black Sea Basin. The person who created these new rules [banning the nets], was a
Fisheries Inspection person, the same person who gave us these documents in the first
place.12
Fishermen’s work was also complicated by new regulation and the SEI similar to the Romanian
Delta (Oltramonti and Tănăsescu, 2019). Konstantyn Balatskii, a DBR ichthyologist who has
commercially fished herring since 1990, explained:
When a fisherman’s on the water and it’s windy and rainy he should write down [in
his journal] the date and time when he left the dock and precisely where he is going. You
12

Interview, November 10, 2009.
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need to write down exactly where you throw your nets, say from seventh to the eighth
kilometer, which nets, their height, width, length, and how many. When you remove the
fish from the water, you should write down at that moment how many herring or carp
you caught regardless of the wind or rain. You write down the weight when you hand it
in, the date and time again, where you handed it in, and include the firm’s receipt. A
whole accounting system.
In the Soviet Union, a fisherman received a fishing ticket stating his name, how many
nets he has for herring, for freshwater fish. You sat in your boat and went to fish. You
came back and handed fish over at the fish-receiving point. If you didn’t bring the fish but
instead sold it somewhere and were caught, you would be in violation. Now, if you’ve
caught fish but haven’t written it down in your journal…you’ve stolen the fish even
though you just caught it and haven’t even removed it from the nets. If you didn’t write it
down, then you are a lawbreaker.13
In the mid-1990s the Reserve began to play a more important role in regulating access
to Danube fisheries on its territories and shifted towards managing them as a limited-access
common pool resource. In 1996, MENR issued an order requiring reserve administrations to
take part in distributing quotas for TACs that encompass protected areas (DPNR, 1997, 117).
That year the Reserve began making contracts with enterprises fishing on their territory and
created a pass system for fishermen. Fishermen had previously accessed reserve territory
through the collective or processing plant and administrators had no say in how many
fishermen entered. In 1996 administrators set the number of passes at 355 (DPNR, 1997, 117).
In 2002 the number was then lowered to 305 to reflect the actual number of Vylkovchany
fishing at the herring run’s peak (DBR, 2003, 117). In 2005 the cost of the pass was set at 30
liters of petrol, an amount the administrators calculated to help cover the DBR’s fuel needs to
monitor the core zone. This system was subsequently included in the DBR’s polozhennia and
territorial organization document.
The DBR justified the reduction because of overfishing and sharp declines in freshwater
species (DBR, 1999, 115). Administrators and fishing firms acknowledge that fishermen catch
13

Interview, June 3, 2011.
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twice the amount of fish set by the quotas and that banned species are also caught.14 The DBR
views this as a serious problem. However, administrators advocate state-level reform rather
than prohibiting fisheries and uses the pass system as their key strategy to limit extraction
(DBR, 2006, 212).15 Limiting the number of passes was initially controversial (DBR, 2003, 117).
However, as fish stocks have further declined and as Vylkovchany became aware of outsiders’
attempts to access fisheries on DBR territory, firm directors and many – though not all –
fishermen came to support the DBR’s existence because it excludes outside firms and
fishermen and encourages professional conduct. The DBR’s creation and administrators’
strategies are thus part of a broader process of internal territorialization related to nature
conservation, fisheries, and other environmental regulation.
The article’s next sections home in on two legal cases and the subsequent rezoning
process. “The TAC case” shows how the contradiction between the Protected Area Law’s Article
9.1 and the Fisheries Law, the lack of clarifying regulation, and the abolishment of permitissuing departments during administrative reform generated struggles between MENR and
MAP-affiliated officials to claim authority to issue the TAC and permits for fisheries in protected
areas. While the Meotida National Park closed fisheries16 and Tuzlovski Limans National Park
administrators integrated themselves into Inspections’ illicit extraction networks until
environmental activists replaced them in 2015,17 DBR officials engaged in litigation to defend
the legality of fisheries’ conduct and mobilized bureaucratic connections to establish interim
agreement about which laws rule. In litigating DBR administrators also asserted to inspectors,
“no, we will not pay” and “no, you cannot extract from fishermen on the basis that the TAC is
illegal.” “The core zone fishery case” highlights a different aspect of disputed territoriality,
namely conflicting interpretations of environmentalists, the DBR and MENR regarding what the
Protected Areas law permits in territory classified as “core zone.” The rezoning process
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For a possible explanation see Wheeler 2017. He argues that over-quota fishing stems from
fishermen’s view of fish as abundant rather than scarce. This presentist orientation is produced by their
formal alienation from the existing property regime and drives accumulation processes (232).
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In 2005, the DBR began to issue a pass to people fishing in the buffer zone that did not require the
payment of fuel.
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Grigorii Goncharev, interview, June 16, 2015.
17
Vitalii Viazovskii, Firm Director, October 21, 2016.
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demonstrates how contentious cooperation between antagonistic parties (DBR administrators,
fishermen, ministry officials) produced a territorial reclassification that allowed DBR
management strategies to continue. A final section shows the significance of Voloshkevych and
Fedorenko’s life histories, ethical commitments and social relationships for understanding why
they participated in litigation.
The TAC case
On March 21, 2014, three days after Russia formally annexed Crimea, an inspector from
the BSSEI, one of SEI’s regional sub-units, presented DBR administrators with her inspection
results. The inspector claimed that DBR-based fisheries violated Article 9.1 because the DBR
had followed the 2011 Fisheries Law and used a TAC prepared by NAF instead of MENR. The
inspector outlined these violations in two documents: a report which calculated the fines the
DBR was obliged to pay; and an injunction legally obliging the Reserve to administer fishing
according to Article 9.1. Fedorenko immediately prepared documents to appeal the report in
the Kiliia District Court, and the injunction in the Odesa Circuit Administrative Court. If the
wrong body had issued the TAC, fishing should cease and the DBR should revoke fishing passes.
Fishermen could in practice still fish but if caught, they and their firm would have to give the
inspector a much larger cut than for violations detailed earlier. There would also be more
serious legal repercussions for administrators for negligence.
The Reserve had not followed Article 9.1 because the contradiction between the
Protected Area and Fisheries Laws had caused problems in 2012-2014 (DBR, 2014, 259-268). A
quote from the DBR’s September 5, 2012 Scientific-Technical Coordinating Committee meeting
reveals the issues at stake. This committee – comprised of firm directors, the mayor, local state
officials, village heads, DBR scientists, the heads of the reed-harvesting and fishing associations
– meets each fall to approve the TAC, other harvest limits, and individual quotas for fishing,
reed-harvesting, and tourism. Voloshkevych began his discussion of the fisheries’ TAC with this:
With the introduction of Article 9.1 the regulation of fisheries [responsibility for
preparing the TAC] in the DBR was transferred from the Fisheries Agency [NAF] to the
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Reserve Administration. However, [Article 9.1] has not been reinforced by regulation.18 As
a result, a kind of dual power has emerged. MENR promised to get the Cabinet of
Ministers to issue an order with some instructions but they did not.
During this time, NAF drafted a new Fisheries Law which passed in 2011. … A
week ago, we received draft changes to the Protected Area Law which supposedly claims
the Protected Area Law is primary [in regulating resource use in protected areas]. When
there is such mess [chekharda]19 in Kyiv it’s very difficult to bring order [poriadok] to our
affairs here.
During this period where Kyiv is changing the legislation, we [the Fisheries
Agency and the DBR] have decided to submit identical sets of documents [justifying the
size of the TAC] in parallel to MENR and to MAP.
Further complications arose in 2013. First, in March, MENR’s Oblast-level Departments
of Nature Protection, the units that issue permits for natural resource use in protected areas,
were abolished as part of state-wide administrative reforms and replaced by Offices of Natural
Resources subordinated to oblast (regional) state administrations. More consequentially, the
new Offices were not made legal successors20 of MENR’s regional departments. Thus, no
administrative body existed anymore that could legally issue permits. Without permits, firms
could not fish legally. Although this did not affect fishing in spring 2013, DBR administrators
anticipated problems in 2014.
Second, in July 2013, Ukraine’s General Prosecutor conducted an inspection of MENR.
The auditors’ report claimed that MENR had exceeded its authority in preparing and approving
TACs and permits via Article 9.1, and declared MENR’s TAC illegal. MENR subsequently issued a
statement cancelling the 2013 Danube fisheries’ TAC which meant that technically no TAC
existed and no commercial fishing should occur in the DBR. The DBR received a letter from the
BSSEI stating that the Reserve should cancel fishermen’s passes and stop all fishing in its
territory. Administrators refused, arguing that the MAP-issued TAC was identical to MENR’s.
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Because MENR cancelled its TAC, in fall 2013 the DBR decided it would follow the
Fisheries Law instead of Article 9.1 in preparing the 2014 TAC. This Law explicitly stated that
NAF is responsible for issuing TACs for all water bodies, including in protected areas. In fall
2013, NAF officials arranged for a Cabinet of Ministers order stipulating that the newly created
Natural Resource Offices would issue five-year fishing permits (replacing MENR-issued one-year
permits). However, the order stated that permits would not apply to protected areas. DBR
Administrators tried unsuccessfully to persuade MENR to officially recognize the Fisheries
Agency’s TAC and the validity of five-year permits in reserve territories. To bridge this
regulatory gap, in February 2014 the DBR and NAF got Mykola Skoryk, then Head of the Odesa
Oblast State Administration (henceforth OOSA), to issue a directive to support fisheries’
conduct according to the Fisheries Law.21
The third factor, which highlights the crux of the issue, is that the Odesa Oblast
Prosecutor launched two criminal investigations of DBR administrators within nine months of
each other. In April 2013, the Odesa Oblast Prosecutor investigated DBR on the suspicion that
fishing was being conducted illegally in the Reserve because the MENR-approved TAC was
illegal, and the DBR should not have participated in preparing it. Then, in late January 2014, the
Oblast Prosecutor launched another criminal investigation into the DBR for negligence in
allowing the illegal catch of fish on its territory because the MAP’s TAC was illegal.
Administrators were not prosecuted and the cases were eventually closed.
This is the prehistory to the BSSEI inspector’s report and injunction. Although the DBR
won its case in the Kiliia District Court excusing them from a fine, they lost their lawsuit over
the injunction.22 Although the Reserve lost the case, by the time the court made its decision in
December 2014, MENR had made stronger official statements backing up the use of the
Fisheries Law for calculating TACs and held an official meeting with the SEI and NAF Heads
because of pressure from DBR administrators, OOSA officials, the Fishing Association, and NAF.
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Skoryk was forced to step down a few weeks later because of the Maidan Revolution.
The judge argued that before following the 2011 Fisheries Law, Reserve administrators should have
formally prepared and sought approval from MENR for a TAC under Article 9.1.
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Voloshkevych’s use of the term “dual power”– possibly an allusion to Lenin’s description
of the Russian state’s power structure following the 1917 February Revolution – evocatively
captures the way in which Article 9.1 created a field of struggle over the conduct of fisheries on
the territories of Ukraine’s protected area system. As a consequence of the hastily passed
Article 9.1, fisheries could not operate according to the Protected Areas or the Fisheries Laws.
There was clarity neither about the rules that applied to DBR territory nor about which body
had the authority to make them. Different law enforcement agencies in favor of one or other
interpretation could construe fishing as illegal, try to hold DBR administrators responsible for its
unlawful conduct, and to extract from fishing firms. DBR administrators thus engaged in
litigation over TAC’s legality not only to defend the conduct of fisheries and to limit scope for
informal payments, but also to draw the attention of officials in different institutions to legal
contradictions so that they would use their authority to bring “order” to the “mess.”
The core zone fisheries case
In May 2014, as the insurgency in eastern Ukraine morphed into war, two
environmental NGOs, Kyiv Ecological-Cultural Centre (KECC) and EcoLaw-Kyiv, initiated a lawsuit
against MENR accusing it of contravening Articles 16 and 18 of the Protected Areas Law. They
accused MENR of negligence in allowing the DBR to operate on the basis of its 2008 Ministryapproved polozhennia which permitted fishing in the DBR’s core zone.
Volodmyr Boreiko, the director of KECC, is one of Ukraine’s most high-profile
environmentalists. He advocates a version of “fortress conservation” called absolutna
zapovidnist’ that seeks to radically limit human activity in reserves.23 When Article 9.1 was
introduced in 2010, Boreiko successfully lobbied for the adoption of another amendment which
expanded the ban on hunting from the core zone only to all protected area zones.24 Although
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For more about absolutna zapovidnist’ see KECC’s website: http://ecoethics.ru/idea-absolyutnoyzapovednosti/. For a critique see “Absolutnaia zapovednost’ vs humans” Zerkalo nedeli 14 August 2015
http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECOLOGY/absolyutnaya-zapovednost-vs-chelovek-_.html and Boreiko’s response to
it “In defense of absolutnaia zapovednost’” Zerkalo nedeli 21 August 2015.
http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECOLOGY/v-zaschitu-absolyutnoy-zapovednosti-_.html.
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amendment to the relevant committee. No expert evaluation was conducted. It likely passed because it
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DBR administrators benefitted from Boreiko’s support during the Bystre conflict, they and other
reserve administrators were disturbed by what they viewed as smear campaigns to discredit all
reserve administrations. According to them, Boreiko’s strategy is to gather information – often
by petitioning Inspection Agencies – and to present it to Oblast Prosecutors in order to initiate
criminal investigations. In the lead-up to the case against the Ministry, Boreiko issued
statements accusing the DBR of operating as a criminal cover for poachers.25 The TAC disputes
arising from Article 9.1 may therefore have influenced this lawsuit’s timing.
The NGOs built their case on the DBR’s Ministry-approved polozhennia and on Articles
16 and 18. They asserted that the polozhennia allowed fisheries to operate in the core zone
which contradicted Article 16. According to them, Article 16 says all economic activity is
prohibited in core zones; therefore, fisheries operating in the DBR’s core zone are illegal. They
called on MENR and the DBR to remove this contradiction in the DBR’s documents, and to close
fisheries in the core zone.
DBR administrators asked to be involved as a third party in defending the Ministry, and
by extension the Reserve because of the major impact it could have on their work and because
of their knowledge of the issues. In December 2014, Fedorenko travelled 20 hours by bus to
attend the case’s second meeting in the Kyiv Circuit Administrative Court while Voloshkevych
was in the Odesan court regarding the other case. Fedorenko returned to Kyiv in January to
attend the court’s final meeting.
The DBR mobilized documents, letters, along with supporting evidence and testimony to
counter the NGOs’ arguments on several key issues to assist MENR in constructing its
arguments.
First, they claimed that fishing did not just happen in the delta. Fishing was actually key
in creating the delta in the form that it currently exists. To demonstrate, a scientist from the
Academy’s Hydrobiology Institute who had researched the delta for decades testified that the
Kiliia Delta’s geomorphology – particularly its interior lake system that supported the delta’s

fit with common sense that protected areas should have no human activity and because deputies were
preoccupied with the Presidential election.
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On Voloshkevych’s defense see: “On twisting facts according to the Boreiko-Brinikh method” on
Environmental NGO Pechenegi’s website http://pechenegy.org.ua/ru/node/1154
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rich biodiversity – had acquired its current form because of fishermen’s actions. The purpose of
this testimony to demonstrate that fisheries are an “environment-creating factor.”
Second, fisheries were not prohibited when a protected area was created. To
demonstrate, Fedorenko used a copy of the 1967 Ukrainian SSR decree which founded the
original protected area. It banned reed harvesting and pasturing but explicitly stated that
fishing could continue according to rules set by the Fisheries Ministry. The documents
establishing the Black Sea Nature Reserve branch (1973) and then the DPNR (1981)
demonstrated that this provision was never subsequently cancelled.
Third, commercial fishing remains a significant income source for Vylkovchany and is
conducted on a legal basis. The DBR, mayor, and Fishing Association submitted a joint
statement outlining the procedures for fisheries’ conduct along with sample licenses, permits,
contracts and passes. They sought to counter arguments that fishing is conducted in an
unregulated manner that treats DBR territory as an open access regime and that makes all
fishing equivalent to poaching.
Fourth, biosphere reserves are premised on nature conservation’s coexistence with
traditional economic activities. Fedorenko argued for the inseparability of national law and
international norms in managing biosphere reserves while Ukraine’s MAB representative from
the Academy testified about Ukraine’s obligations under UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere
program and the Seville Strategy.
Fifth, a critical point revolved around the interpretation of Article 16. The NGO claimed
that this article bans economic activity outright. In court, Fedorenko sought to demonstrate
that it does not by reading out this passage: “economic and other activity that undermines the
declared goal [emphasis added] of the protected area object is prohibited.”
To MENR officials’ and DBR administrators’ surprise, the judges ruled in MENR’s favor.
The NGOs appealed to the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal and lost. Then, EcoLaw-Kyiv
appealed to the Higher Administrative Court without KECC and on May 24, 2016, judges ruled in
its favor. They argued that according to the Constitution, the 1992 Law is primary in regulating
protected areas and that any contradictions in DBR documents should be removed. DBR
administrators considered appealing to Ukraine’s Supreme Court. However, because there
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were no other similar cases, they decided to implement the court’s decision. Instead of
prohibiting fishing – one way to implement the decision – they decided to make their
polozhennia align with the judge’s interpretation of Article 16. They undertook a rezoning
processes in order to shift the territorial classification of fishing grounds from “core zone” to
“regulated protected zone.”
Implementing the Higher Administrative Court ruling through rezoning the DBR
The DBR’s rezoning involved eight months of negotiating with fishing firm directors,
fishermen, MENR officials, OOSA officials, and the Academy, and occasionally issuing threats to
move the process along. They simultaneously worked to prevent information about their plans
from reaching Boreiko so that he would not derail them. MENR responded to the court ruling
by issuing an order on June 24, 2016 that removed all fishing-related articles from the DBR’s
polozhennia without consulting the DBR or the Academy. Consequently, Voloshkevych first had
to convince MENR’s Nature Protection Department Head to support the DBR’s rezoning. This
meant persuading him to agree to change the polozhennia again, and the territorial
organization document, in order to legalize fisheries and the pass system.26
Next, they figured out which core zone areas to reclassify as “regulated protected zone,”
the second strictest zone and the only other zone where they could keep the pass system. This
was crucial for maintaining fisheries as a “limited-access common pool resource” because
without the pass system, DBR territory would be open to all 32 firms that obtain quotas under
the Danube TACs, not just the 11 Vylkove-based firms. This would turn the DBR into what
Fedorenko called a prokhodnoi dvor, a Russian term for a courtyard that can be entered from
many sides,27 something like an open access regime. Without a pass system, DBR would have
no “powers of exclusion” (Hall et al. 2011), that is, legitimate authority to exclude resource
users on its territory and thereby limit the catch. DBR administrators also had to rezone without
dramatically reducing the core zone’s size, a problem they resolved by transferring some
coastal waters from the buffer zone to the core zone. They were thus able to remove fishing
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grounds and two fishing stations from the core zone without MENR opposition. The fact that
the coastal waters are state property rather than private property and required approval only
from the enterprise that runs the Bystre shipping lane made this possible.
Administrators held two formal meetings with fishing firm directors in July to obtain
their approval. Firm directors had expressed anger at the court decision and frustration that the
Reserve’s presence again threatened their livelihoods. They proposed to protest at MENR in
Kyiv and to block the Bystre channel. Angry that the DBR did not support protests, one
association member commented flippantly, “The Reserve was created under the influence of
wine and guitar songs” (by people who weren’t serious). Voloshkevych replied, “Well, we can
step aside and you can sort this out yourselves.” Sobered, firm directors backed down. They
agreed to support the bureaucratic process while administrators agreed to support direct
action if MENR stalled.28
Voloshkevych and Fedorenko had dealings with other officials in July, not all of which
were amicable. After a special meeting with the OOSA’s deputy head and other officials, the
DBR received written support for rezoning. However, in late July, the BSSEI inspector whose
report they had disputed showed up to monitor the DBR’s rezoning plans and to pronounce on
the legality of fishing still taking place. Administrators said they would not share their draft plan
to avoid it being leaked to Boreiko who had received other reports about the DBR from the
inspector’s supervisors. Tension grew when the inspector claimed the DBR should have stopped
fishing completely because MENR had removed fisheries-related articles from their
polozhennia. Fedorenko and Voloshkevych threatened to bring fishing firms directors in so that
she could tell them herself. They reminded her that the legal system gives them time to
implement a court decision, that the fisheries’ legality does not hinge on the polozhennia alone,
and that they were not obliged to provide information to a third party, particularly one like the
BSSEI that “had a policy” in which its “zealous guys on the water” dealt with violations by
demanding “the redistribution of profits.”29 She backed down.
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But the challenges were not over. In early August they reached a preliminary agreement
with MENR about the wording of their polozhennia and territorial organization document. In
September, however, when these documents began to “go from office to office” to gather
approval signatures and arrived in the law department, MENR’s lawyers raised objections about
their use of “regulated protected zone.”30 According to the 1992 law, this zone only applied to
territories that were designated as a lower-level protected area (e.g. a zakaznyk) and
subsequently became a higher-level protected area. Because Ministry officials were fearful of
the denunciatory and litigious Boreiko (who had extensive contacts in MENR because of
previous employment there), Ministry officials did not want to deviate from the law. When it
seemed that the Nature Protection Department Head was withdrawing support, Voloshkevych
threatened to help organize fishermen’s protests and to throw his support behind the highly
public activists-turned-administrators of Tuzlovski Limans National Park in neighboring
Tatarbunary District who were calling for the Head’s removal.31 MENR officials then stipulated
that the DBR needed to get additional documentation from the Academy in support of the
DBR’s rezoning. However, MENR lawyers still blocked final approval.
In January 2017, DBR administrators and firm directors wrote a letter to the OOSA’s
head, who in turn pressured the Minister. Meanwhile Vylkove’s mayor wrote the Deputy
Minister. For some reason, Fedorenko said, this “shook the Ministry” and the lawyers agreed to
approve the changes as long as the local authorities created a zakaznyk in territories being
reclassified as “regulated protection zone.”32 On February 24, the Ministry signed the Order,
and commercial fishermen’s presence at the Danube’s Kiliia mouths was once again fully legal
(Figure 2).
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Figure 2 The zones of the Danube Biosphere Reserve after rezoning in 2017. Map by Iryna Iakovlieva. Used with permission.
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Establishing legality and territoriality when laws don’t rule
Litigation arose in response to “legislative gaps and lack of consistency and coherences
between laws,” a key problem in the rule of law’s functioning in Ukraine (Burlyuk, 2015, 5).
Here, however, a single elite group was not able to execute full “regulatory capture,” perhaps
because capture fisheries are not as lucrative as other sectors and have a dispersed ownership
structure. The intensified struggle among MENR- and MAP-associated officials in the TAC case
arose from MENR’s move to take more control over managing resources in protected areas.
Fedorenko’s reflections help clarify bureaucrats’ economic interests in administering the
Danube TACs:
I naively thought that transferring natural resources’ administration to MENR via
Article 9.1 would help us. But we were mistaken. In fact, it’s better for the Fisheries
Agency to look after fisheries. Not because they run them better. But because the NAF
employees are interested in the fisheries themselves. This is because they have the ability
to make money for themselves. It’s bad for them if no one’s fishing.
By contrast, MENR employees are interested in disrupting the process of fishing
firms getting their documents. They don’t get anything from fishing directly. But there is
the temptation to take something when preparing the TACs and issuing permits. So they
delay this process to force firms to pay. According to the law, TACs should be approved by
November 1. This never happened. The MENR was always two and a half months late and
prepared them by mid-January at best. This caused problems for fishing … because people
couldn’t work.33
A key factor DBR administrators’ ability to litigate is the distinctiveness of post-Soviet
protected areas’ institutional ecologies. Had the DBR been subordinated to MENR,
Voloshkevych and Fedorenko would have been removed long ago. The DBR’s location in the
Academy also enabled administrators to access experts on law and ecology. Although the DBR
charges service fees, many Vylkovchany recognize that their primary goal is not profit-making
but protecting public goods.
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Still, the DBR administrators’ willingness to litigate cannot be explained solely with
reference to the Academy. For instance, their colleagues in the Black Sea Biosphere Reserve
were arrested in 2011 for participating in an illegal scheme to harvest shrimp on their
territories. DBR administrators’ intellectual backgrounds, long residence in Vylkove and the
delta, legal knowledge, and refusal to give and take informal payments inclined them to litigate
rather than avoid courts. Voloshkevych, born in Starokostiantyniv in Khmelnytskii Oblast, is an
ichthyologist with a candidat degree in biology who has researched Danube fish since the 1980s
and married a woman from Vylkove. Fedorenko was born in a village in Zhytomyr Oblast and
has a candidat degree in history. His late 1980s work in dispute resolution for the Communist
Party gave him a feel for bureaucracy and managing conflicts. He, his wife, and two sons moved
to Vylkove in the early 1990s after he left his job in Odesa State University’s history department
to apprentice as a beekeeper with his wife’s brother-in-law. (Their apiary still supplements their
income). Voloshkevych and Fedorenko thus bring together professional expertise in the social
and biological dimensions of conservation in ways that parallel biosphere reserves’ goal of
facilitating people’s co-existence with nature.
Their commitment to enabling Vylkovchany’s livelihoods is pragmatic, ethical, and
moral. Their decades-long observations of the delta and conversations with fishermen
convinced them that fishing had helped create the habitats they were tasked with protecting.
Witnessing rampant poaching in the 1990s persuaded them that local residents needed to
make a living if nature conservation were to work. Study trips during the World Bank project
provided concrete models of how to support livelihoods. Further, because the Academy
provided salaries only, administrators had to generate income to cover operational costs.
Charging monetary and in-kind fees created mutual dependencies between the local fishing
firms (who get preferential access to fishing grounds) and the DBR (which receives gas for its
wardens’ boats). When I asked Voloshkevych why they put so much energy into defending
fisheries he replied: “When the reserve was created 50 years ago, and the DBR in 1998, the
state guaranteed that fishing would be preserved. That’s why Vylkovchany agreed to the DBR’s
creation. To deceive the local community would be very bad.”34
34
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Nevertheless, defending the fisheries’ legality required time, and energy and
considerable knowledge of laws and regulation. When I asked why the Association did not hire
a lawyer to pursue litigation Voloshkevych answered:
There are very many subtle legal issues connected with nature protection legislation. No
one knows them better than Fedorenko and I. If they hired their own lawyer then we
would have to explain everything to them, and we are not sure that they would
understand. It’s also not clear how well this lawyer could respond to questions in court.
It is not a simple conflict over property. You have to know many historical aspects. So it
is easier for Fedorenko and I to do this for them.35
While Reserve administrators do periodically consult a professionally trained lawyer, it is
usually to run their own arguments by him. Fedorenko’s effectiveness in assembling evidence
and arguments also stems from a deep engagement with questions of what law is, articles of
particular laws, how Ukraine’s legal system works, a canny sense of what he calls the “force of a
document,” and the personal pleasure he takes in solving legal problems. In another life, he
might have been a legal scholar or a jurist.
Administrators’ actions arise from a position on the relationship between law and
society which differs from many people they deal with, and not only those engaged in informal
and illicit economies. Fedorenko is critical of lawyers’ and judges’ “formalism” and their
insensitivity to the “spirit of the law” – a law’s relationship to broader social, economic, and
ecological contexts, and international norms (cf. Solomon, 2012). He was particularly critical of
NGOs’ “fortress conservation” approach:
Their argument is based on the claim that Article 16 bans everything. No guys. Read it.
There is an if implied. If it doesn’t contradict the protected area’s purpose. Life and nature
are diverse, rich, and unique. Why do you have to force them into narrow frames?
Sometimes there is a human activity that facilitates the maintenance of biodiversity.36
Here Fedorenko rejects the strict nature/society dualism informing environmentalists’
approach, an approach deeply embedded in conservation practice (Roth, 2008). For him,
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Ibid.
Interview, June 9, 2015.
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environmentalists’ failure to see humans’, plants’, and animals’ deep entanglement and the
species-rich landscapes they co-create undermines the conditions for human and nonhuman
life to flourish, a view that partially corresponds the precepts of “convivial conservation”
(Büscher and Fletcher, 2019, 285).
Finally, Fedorenko criticized environmentalists (and later the Higher Administrative Court)
for ignoring international norms:
They said that the court is not obliged to take the Seville Strategy into account because
Ukraine hasn’t ratified it. But that’s not right. The Protected Areas Law says that
biosphere reserves exist on the combined basis of national and international law. Our
Reserve could not be a biosphere reserve without UNESCO’s approval. This procedure is
written in the law. Either they don’t understand this or they know the truth but pretend
they don’t understand. Boreiko is not interested in this.37
Here Fedorenko demonstrates the way in which international and Ukrainian norms can be
interpreted in ways that allow for a place-specific approach to managing protected areas’
distinct ecologies.
Together Voloshkevych and Fedorenko are much more than lawyer and jurist. Their
interpretation of laws and coordination of political directives in 2013-2016 helped establish
temporary political consensus about which laws should rule among key institutions. This
allowed fishing to continue despite being formally “unregulated.” Fedorenko observed, “If
there were no reserve here, the delta would be like other water bodies … where some powerful
outsider sets up a monopoly and extracts uncontrollably. With the Reserve here, we have been
able to establish a bit of order (poriadok) where local people have priority to fish rather than
outside firms and outside fishermen.”38 Grigorii Goncharev affirmed, “The [administrators]
uphold a regime. We work with them to try and prevent outsiders from coming.”39 Fishing firm
director Vitalii Viazovskii said, “We wish other agencies would work like the DBR. When there is
a problem, we meet and discuss. They meet people halfway so they are not hungry.”40
37

Interview, June 9, 2015.
Telephone interview, March 1, 2016.
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Interview, June 16, 2015.
40
Interview, October 21, 2016.
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However, no love is lost between DBR administrators and firm directors. Harsh criticisms flow in
both directions. Nevertheless, administrators take their obligations to 650 fishermen seriously
while fishing firms see the DBR as line of defense against those who would dispossess them.
Conclusion
DBR administrators engaged in litigation to defend claims about which rules apply to
resource use in particular territories and in particular zones of them. Overlapping laws,
regulation, and jurisdictions in the Danube produced legal indeterminacies that could have
excluded fishermen from fishing grounds and radically expanded the scope for inspection
agencies’ illicit revenue-generating schemes. The DBR administrators’ ability to litigate helped
prevent such scenarios even though judges ruled against them. Through reclassifying parts of
core zone as “regulated protected zone,” the DBR maintained authority to limit access to a
finite number of local fishermen, to exclude non-local firms, and to prevent inspectors from
increasing their cut.
Some readers might see little to celebrate in these hierarchical-state-centric-stillcapitalist arrangements (cf. Buscher and Fletcher, 2019). However, prime fishing grounds in the
DBR remain accessible to local fishermen. This is thus a modest success story in defending
commons in post-Soviet Ukraine characterized by ever increasing enclosures and rampant
illegal resource extraction. This is not a story of local state officials subverting policy to maintain
the public good (Allina-Pisano, 2004) but of administrators litigating to establish legality in the
absence of laws and regulation that would clarify natural resources’ territorial governance. In
the rush to privatize because of Ukraine’s war-induced economic crisis and to denounce all
state institutions, officials, and public forms of ownership as corrupt and inefficient, perhaps
this story can serve as a reminder of how a Ukrainian public institution can work for the benefit
of a community and help defend it against predatory behavior and unjust enclosures.
This article argues that analyzing litigation can enhance our understandings of struggles
over protected areas, fisheries, and the politics of natural resource governance. Whereas Fay
demonstrated how litigation is both the outcome of neoliberal conservation and a means to
challenge it, this article shows how litigation is both an outcome of a post-Soviet
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territorialization process related to nature conservation and fisheries management, and a
means to challenge it. Technologies of neoliberalism are evident in the Reserve’s reliance on
service fees and in audit agencies’ proliferation. However, the prevalence of litigation in the
DBR arises more from particular entanglements of business, law, and state institutions in postSoviet countries and how people working in each have absorbed and tried to limit neoliberal
capitalism’s effects than from neoliberal conservation per se. Finally, it shows how oftendisparaged reserve administrators – their biographies, their ethical commitments, and their
relationships – can make a difference in how conservation-related territorialization affects local
livelihoods.
Glossary of abbreviations and terms:
BSSEI – Black Sea State Ecological Inspection, a subunit of the State Ecological Inspection
DBR – Danube Biosphere Reserve
DPNR – Dunaiskii Plavni Nature Reserve (the DBR’s predecessor)
KECC – Kyiv Ecological-Cultural Centre founded by Volodymyr Boreiko
MAP – Ministry of Agrarian Policy
MENR – Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources
NAF – National Agency of Fisheries, formerly the State Committee on Fisheries
polozhennia – foundational document
OOSA – Odesa Oblast State Administration
SEI – State Ecological Inspection
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